By Alexandros Sainidis

There can be found simplicity in nuclear weapons – because total annihilation is quite straightforward and ultimate. Foolishly, we transfer the same view to nuclear deterrence – we don’t shoot ’cause they will shoot back and the damage will be too much to bear. The Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is one evidence of deterrence complexity. Signed by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, on May 26, 1972, as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), the ABM Treaty sought to decrease the development and deployment of missile defence systems that could undermine the strategic balance of Mutual Assured Destruction or MAD (don’t shoot – they will shoot back). But why in the world would something defensive like this be restricted? 

After all, a duel between two warriors using shields is much less violent than a duel of swords. Two cities with walls also inspire a sense of relative stability. And in military history, even the more economic thought of R. Gilpin suggests that offensive technology can introduce far more international changes than defensive technology. For example, cannons changed history by demolishing walls. 

The fallacy begins with the application of this exact analogy of walls and cannons to Antiballistic Missile Systems and nuclear weapons. While the wall is an ancient technology providing far more stability, the cannon appeared at the beginning of the 12th century in Europe. The defence was working for more than a thousand years, creating the demand for the technology of gunpowder, which was simply not there yet. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is the inverse – an offensive weapon preceding the ABM system. In fact, nuclear weapons created the demand for ABM systems. The problem is – ABM systems are not perfect and are, in fact, very costly.

The second important factor is scale. Under certain circumstances, the destruction of walls and military assets is not condemned by humanity. In theory, a wall can be destroyed without collateral damage. The same does not apply to nuclear weapons (even remotely), due to the scale of destruction. Therefore, the stakes are extremely high. Even if the chance of failure was practically zero, the destruction is so great that the scenario cannot be tolerated. 

Let us now tie the pieces of the puzzle together. It is stated that “the two sides (USA and USSR) reasoned that limiting defensive systems would reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any defense that the other might deploy” (Arms Control Association, n.d.). The original vulnerability is what makes the deterrence balance work, basically, while more firepower is required to overwhelm the opposing defensive system, increasing arms. 

However, I always imagined a slightly different approach; one involving windows of opportunity. What if the arms race was actually transforming into a race for the best defence? To be more concrete, if either the USA or USSR developed the perfect shield, then the other would not be able to retaliate, negating the deterrence balance. But that’s not all. Because your opponent now has the perfect shield, they can attack you with no fear of a counterattack. And because you are afraid that this will happen, there is a window of opportunity closing – for you to attack them first. This is the reason why relevant treaties and negotiations address both the sides of offence and defence. When the great powers are this big and scary, offence and defence are like credit and debit. 

Interestingly, a similar logic applies to another situation involving a much more silent killer than nuclear energy, acting outside war and inside economies – CO2.

Our common environment can only withstand a certain amount of carbon dioxide but it is still essential for running factories and mass production. At the same time, the world economy is unequal and the largest amount of CO2 was generated by today’s top economic players. This leaves us with developing economies that also want to use fossil fuels with low environmental standards to boost their production. As a grave consequence, when they hear that greater powers are preaching green sustainability, they, of course, view it critically. For the remaining CO2 that we can produce as a planet, countries at the bad end of inequality want to be the ones that use this window of opportunity. 

Perhaps, this type of a game should be highlighted more in the future as a tool of understanding and acting. Situations involving opposing interests, confused by common threats to existence need to be addressed in a more savvy way. Is this a matter of trust or clandestine diplomacy? Communication is not sufficient – information is not action. What seems to be the remedy is leadership along with interest alignment.

References 

Arms Control Association (n.d.). The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance. Retrieved from: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty 

Eric Grynaviski (2010) Necessary Illusions: Misperception, Cooperation, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Security Studies, 19:3, 376-406, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2010.503512 

National Park Service (n.d.). Arms & Armament. Retrieved from: https://www.nps.gov/casa/learn/historyculture/arms.htm